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In this paper, we present evidence on how employers perceive labor regulations and 
react when these are perceived to constrain the operation of their firm.  The paper draws 
from harmonized surveys of (up to) 17,000 firms around the world and compares 
employers’ responses with actual labor legislation. We find that employers’ concerns 
about labor regulations are closely matched by the relative stringency of de jure labor 
laws. Countries that have, from an international perspective, tight labor regulations tend 
to have higher proportions of employers reporting these regulations as severe 
constraints.  But not all firms are affected in the same way by onerous labor regulations. 
Medium-size firms are those whose business and prospects for growth are most 
negatively affected. Similarly, innovating firms are disproportionally affected by tight 
labor regulations. There is also clear evidence in the data that firms facing tight 
regulations invest more in training and make greater use of temporary employment. 
Small firms mainly rely on temporary employment, while medium and large firms, as well 
as innovating firms, tend to rely more on on-the-job training if labor regulations make 
hiring and firing very costly.             
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Economists and policy makers have long debated about the effects of hiring and firing 
regulations on workers’ and firms’ behavior.  Some form of intervention in this area is 
clearly justified by the need to protect workers from arbitrary actions and to provide some 
stability in employment, which can be particularly important in the absence of effective 
social safety nets. There could also be efficiency considerations to the extent hiring and 
firing regulations lead to long-lasting work relationships that encourage firms’ investment 
in the human capital of their workforce.  But, as with the majority of labor regulations, 
onerous employment protection provisions can raise labor costs and reduce job creation.  
Moreover, by raising labor adjustment costs, employment protection may also reduce 
firms’ ability to cope with a rapidly changing global economy and take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by new technologies and access to new markets.  When labor 
demand is reduced by onerous employment protection, vulnerable groups in the labor 
market – including women, youths and the low skilled – generally bear most of the brunt, 
with higher unemployment and weaker access to formal jobs.       
The theoretical and empirical literature on employment protection regulations has grown 
rapidly in the past decade (see the recent reviews by Addison and Teixeira, 2003; 
Heckman and Pagès, 2004; Young, 2003; OECD, 2004).  Most theoretical models are in 
concordance with the idea that, by raising labor adjustment costs, employment protection 
reduces labor mobility.  But there is no consensus as to whether reduced mobility should 
lead to weaker labor market outcomes in terms of employment or unemployment rates.   
As theoretical models have different predictions about the aggregate effects of 
employment protection on the labor market, the issue becomes essentially an empirical 
one.  However, empirical analyses have so far provided varying results.  Indeed, since the 
seminal contribution of Lazear in 1990, a large number of studies have studied the impact 
of employment protection on labor market outcomes using different country samples, 
indicators of regulation and empirical approaches.   
One populated strand of this empirical literature – Lazear (1990), followed by Grubb and 
Wells (1993) and updated by the OECD (1998 and 2004) – attempts to summarize basic 
aspects of the employment protection legislation (EPL) into cardinal indicators.  Lazear 
largely focuses on severance payment provisions and periods of notice required before 
employment termination, while subsequent work extends the coverage of the EPL 
indicators to include the complexity and opacity of procedures for individual and 
collective dismissals and regulations affecting atypical job contracts (fixed-term contracts 
and contracts through temporary work agencies).  The World Bank has recently extended 
the coverage of these indicators to about 140 countries (Djankov et al. 2003).  These 
synthetic indicators have clear advantages.  They code existing regulations using a 
common transparent procedure, thereby enabling cross-country comparisons.  At the 
same time, however, the construction of these EPL indicators suffers from problems of 
subjectivity in the interpretation of legislation, difficulties in aggregating different 
components of the legislation that may have a different impact on firms’ decisions and, 
most importantly, difficulties in attributing scores to legal provisions that may be applied 
differently in practice (Bertola et al. 2000).  This latter point is of particular importance 
  1because countries differ in the degree of enforcement of labor regulations, and 
other --  often informal – rules may be more important than those written in the labor 
codes.   
An alternative approach to gauge the stringency of labor regulations is to rely on surveys 
of employers (e.g. Freeman, 2001; Di Tella and and MacCulloch, forthcoming). Business 
people presumably should know what aspects of labor laws actually affect business 
conditions as well as wages and employment.  This approach is not without problems 
either. The questions raised in the surveys concerning labor regulation are often fairly 
vague and subject to different interpretations.  Managers respond very differently 
depending on whether their company faces good or bad times even if underlying labor 
laws have not changed.  Even more important, business perceptions are rooted in the 
country’s environment in which firms operate: what firms perceive as a constraining 
regulation in their own country may still be fairly liberal from an international 
perspective. Cross-country comparisons may therefore be difficult using business 
perceptions of labor regulations. 
In this paper we bring together two novel sets of data from these two strands of empirical 
literature.  The first draws from a review of legislation in different areas, including labor, 
for about 140 countries around the world in the late 1990s (World Bank, Doing Business 
Database, 2004a).  These data allow the construction of synthetic indicators of the 
stringency of employment protection, summarizing different interrelated aspects of the 
legislation, such as notice period, severance payments, length of temporary contracts, etc.  
These synthetic indicators pass simple validation tests: for example they correlate well 
with other synthetic indicators produced by the OECD for its member countries, arguably 
the most complete measures available.  The second set of data draws from two separate 
surveys of employers conducted by the World Bank in the past few years.  The World 
Bank Business Environment survey (WBES) covers firms in more than 80 countries, but 
the sample in each country is fairly small and information on firms’ characteristics is 
limited.  A more recent survey – the World Bank Investment Climate survey -- so far 
covers fewer countries (about 50) but many more firms in each country. This survey also   
allows for better control for firm characteristics and behavior.   
With these data we address three main questions.  
•  Do employers in countries with relatively more stringent employment protection 
regulation tend to report these regulations as more constraining for their operation 
and growth plans?    
•  Which firms are more likely to report labor regulations as particularly 
constraining for their operation?   
•  Finally, how do firms react to constraining labor regulations?  For example, do 
they hire more temporary workers to circumvent rigid rules for regular workers? 
Do they invest more in training to enable their existing workforce to adjust to new 
technologies, instead of changing the skill composition of the workforce by hiring 
and firing workers?   
  2To anticipate our results we found that, despite weak enforcement in some countries, 
employment protection legislation does matter for employers in their decision to invest 
and expand.  Indeed, countries with relatively more stringent EPL tend to be those where 
employers report more severe constraints from this legislation for their operations and 
potentials for expansion.  Moreover, in countries where employment protection is 
relatively strict, firms make greater use of training to accommodate the workforce to the 
needs of new technologies, but also use more temporary contracts to enhance labor 
flexibility. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we review the theoretical links between 
employment protection and different labor market outcomes and summarize the main 
findings of the empirical literature. In Section 3 we present the data used in our empirical 
analysis.  Section 4 presents the empirical results on the links between employers’ 
perceptions and actual regulations, and on their behavioral responses to these regulations.  
Section 5 details our results and Section 6 concludes.     
2.  Why does EPL matter for employment and labor market flows? 
Most countries have laws and regulations governing the employment relationship 
between workers and firms.  These may be written in labor codes, current legislations and 
norms set by collective agreements.  Within these rules and regulations, those focusing 
on the hiring and firing of workers are often referred to as "employment protection" 
legislations (EPL).  They govern unfair dismissals, restrictions on lay-offs for economic 
reasons, compulsory severance payments, minimum notice periods and administrative 
authorizations, and terms and lengths of fixed-term contracts and the operation of 
temporary work agencies (TWA).   
Theory 
The EPL regulations may affect the equilibrium level of employment --  as well as its 
dynamics over the business cycle -- in different ways.  By reinforcing job security, EPL 
may enhance productivity performance, as workers will be more willing to co-operate 
with employers in the development of the production process (Akerlof, 1984).  To the 
extent that EPL leads to long-lasting work relationships, it may encourage employers to 
provide training to workers with potentially beneficial effects on human capital and labor 
productivity. A better skilled workforce may also increase internal flexibility and thus 
lead to a better functioning of production activity (Piore, 1986).  EPL may also be a way 
to internalize the social costs of dismissals by moving the social burden of re-allocating a 
worker to another job closer to the firm’s profitability criteria (Lindbeck and Snower, 
1988). 
However, if EPL is very strict, firms may become more cautious about adjusting their 
workforce with the ultimate effect of reducing labor turnover, i.e. movements from 
employment to unemployment and from unemployment back to employment (Bertola, 
1992).  Lazear (1990) suggests that this may not have an impact on labor demand if firing 
costs imposed on firms are compensated by reverse transfer from the worker to the firm 
without influencing labor demand.  But even if the cost of EPL cannot be fully shifted to 
  3workers, labor demand may not decline because firms subject to positive shocks will hire 
less workers than otherwise, but also firms with negative shocks will be less prone to 
firing (Bertola, 1990, Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).   
EPL may, however, have other effects on aggregate labor demand.  By raising labor 
adjustment costs, EPL may slow down the reallocation of resources from declining 
industries to growing industries and may have negative implications for economic and 
labor market outcomes.  Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) study a general equilibrium 
model with entry and exit of firms and show that a tax on job destruction can reduce 
employment rate significantly.  However, Alvarez and Varacierto (1998), using an 
extended version of the Hopenhayn and Rogerson model with frictions in a world of 
imperfect insurance markets, show that severance payments may be welfare improving –
 the reduction in firms’ layoffs and stronger search efforts by the unemployed reduce 
unemployment enough to compensate for lower consumption levels due to higher costs 
for firms.     
A different degree of strictness of regulation governing regular versus temporary 
employment (fixed-term contracts and contracts through temporary work agencies) may 
affect the structure of employment.  Stricter regulations for regular contracts relative to 
those for temporary contracts are likely to promote a shift from regular to temporary 
employment (as it is occurring in a number of European countries).  This has the potential 
effect of distorting the optimal composition of employment between temporary and 
regular contracts.  Moreover, those who are able to maintain a regular contract (often the 
insiders) will enjoy an even higher level of job security, bringing about an increase in 
wage pressure (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).  In contrast, those under temporary 
contracts (often youths and other workers with little work experience or low skills) will 
bear the brunt of employment adjustment (Saint Paul, 1996).  
Employment protection legislations are also likely to interact with other policies in the 
labor market.  Bertola and Rogerson (1997) suggest that similar labor market flows can 
be associated with very different employment protection legislation if the welfare state 
cushion the costs of unemployment.  Boeri and Burda (2004) suggest that the presence of  
high firing costs may reinforce the preference for rigid wage regimes: firing costs 
compound renegotiation costs in their model, further increasing the utility of rigid wage 
for workers who keep their jobs. 
  4The empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence on the impact of employment protection legislation is mixed, not 
least because of the lack of suitable data on the enforcement and evolutions of regulations 
over time (Bertola et al., 2000).  A clear distinction exists between the potential effects of 
EPL on employment turnover and on the equilibrium level of employment 
(unemployment) and its composition (temporary/regular; youths/prime-age workers etc.).   
Employment turnover.  There is consistent empirical evidence that strict employment 
protection legislation reduces unemployment turnover.  Under strict EPL provisions, the 
unemployment pool is more stagnant, with fewer people being laid off, but also fewer 
unemployed people getting a new job (see, e.g. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; and Nickell 
and Layard, 1998).  The effects on employment turnover are less clear cut: Bertola and 
Rogerson (1997) and Boeri (1999) found similar job creation and job destruction rates 
across countries with different EPL regimes.  A possible explanation of the contrasting 
results for unemployment and employment flows is that strict EPL may foster job-to-job 
shifts rather than overall employment turnover insofar as employers and workers seek 
direct shifts from one job to another without intervening unemployment spells, in order to 
avoid the associated dismissal and search costs.  
The level of employment.  Some studies (e.g. Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell 1997; Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, forthcoming; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2004) suggest a detrimental effect of 
strict EPL on the level of employment to working-age population ratios. Nickell and 
Layard (1999) indicate that this may be partially due to the low participation rates in 
Southern European countries, which also have strict EPL.  However, participation rates 
may be low, especially amongst the youths, precisely because employment prospects are 
lower the stricter the EPL system.
1       
Overall unemployment rate. There is also no consensus as to the overall impact of EPL 
on unemployment.  Part of the disagreement stems from the use of different models.  
However, disagreement persists even amongst papers using similar indicators (the OECD 
summary index, see OECD 1999).   
Interactions between EPL and other institutions or shocks. The effects of EPL on 
unemployment (or employment) are stronger when accounting for potential interactions   
between EPL and other institutions.  In particular, Elmeskov et al. (1998), Belot and van 
Ours (2000) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004) suggest that stringent employment 
protection tend to increase structural unemployment (or reduce employment) in countries 
where the higher labor costs associated to employment protection are not transferred onto 
                                                 
1   Recent papers have analyzed the impact of EPL reform in individual countries, or states within a 
country.  For example, the EPL reforms in Colombia (Kugler, 2004) and Peru (Saavedra and Torero, 2004) 
in the 1990s led to a higher response of employment to output growth, with speedier employment 
adjustment but also positive employment effects.  In Colombia, the reform has also contributed to increased 
compliance with labor legislation by lowering the costs of formal production. Besley and Burgess (2004) 
found that amendments to the strict employment regulation in Andra Pradesh, one Indian state, in the 1980s 
contributed to raise significantly employment and growth in the next decade. However, other studies 
examining labor reforms in Chile and Brazil found no evidence of statistically significant effects on 
employment. See Pages and Montenegro (1999) for Chile and P. De Barros and Conseuil (2004) for Brazil. 
  5lower wages.  Strong bargaining power of workers and lack of coordination amongst 
workers’ representatives often lead to lower wage flexibility reinforcing the effect of 
stringent EPL on labor market outcomes.  
Other studies have hypothesized that employment protection, as well as other policy and 
institutional factors in the labor market, may affect unemployment primarily by 
magnifying the impact of exogenous shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). However, 
Nickell et al. (2001, 2003) find that unemployment in OECD countries are mainly due to 
changes in labor market policy and institutions with no effect stemming from interactions 
between institutions and shocks.  
Composition of employment and unemployment.  There is greater consensus in the 
empirical literature about the unequal effects of stringent EPL on various demographic 
groups.  While EPL is generally shown to have little or no effect on the employment 
prospect of prime-age men, several studies point to larger negative effects on the 
employment rates of youth and women.
2  Moreover, Grubb and Wells (1993) indicated 
that strict EPL for regular workers may encourage firms to shift to temporary workers 
and more generally foster self-employment.       
But the jurisprudence matters a lot. Employment protection legislation are also subject to 
courts interpretations, leading to an additional source of variation in the de facto 
strictness of EPL across countries and over time.  Ichino et al. (2003) and Bertola et al. 
(2000) suggest that jurisprudence may be affected by the underlying labor market 
conditions; for instance there is evidence that judges’ decisions tend to be particularly 
favorable to workers when unemployment is high.  Moreover, compensations for unfair 
dismissals can deviate largely from the minima set out by legislation because judges may 
account in their final decision for damages corresponding to past and future financial 
losses and psychological damages. There are also large differences in the number of cases 
brought to labor courts, the percentage of cases won by workers and the length of the 
legal procedure.
3 
The role of jurisprudence in influencing the effect of EPL on the labor market is even 
more marked in developing and transition countries.  In Sri Lanka the government 
decides the amount of compensation for laid-off workers and has the authority to reject 
employer demands.  The time needed for processing the request for a layoff can be highly 
unpredictable, taking six months on average, but much more if the procedure involves 
hearings where employers explain their financial performance and business plans to the 
government to justify the layoff.  In Russia, before the reform of the labor code, trade 
                                                 
2   Nickell and Layard (1998), Scarpetta (1996) and OECD (1999) suggest a stronger effect of strict 
EPL on youth unemployment.  Di Tella and MacCulloch (forthcoming) for OECD countries, and Heckman 
and Pages (2004) for Latin American countries suggest a negative effect of strict EPL on female 
employment.   
3   For example, while only about 1 per cent of total layoffs end up in court in Australia where 90 
percent of the cases are resolved by conciliation, more than 20 percent of layoffs end up in court in France 
and Germany and, in the former, 75 percent of these cases are won by workers (see OECD, 2004).  
Moreover, while on average it takes only a few months for courts to decide on a labor dispute in the United 
Kingdom, the US, New Zealand and Germany, it takes more than one year in France and in Italy. 
  6unions had veto power over dismissals for staff reductions or for employees not suited to 
the job (See World Bank (2003)).  Before the 1999 reform in Brazil, representatives of 
employers and workers sat on the jury of labor courts, a practice that often led to 
protracted procedures and difficulties in reaching compromise.  Because of the 
complexity of the severance pay schemes, more than 6 percent of all salaried workers 
(about 2 million) usually filed a lawsuit every year and the average labor dispute took 
almost three years.  The reform restricted the jury to professional lawyers and cut the 
time to resolve a dispute by half (World Bank, 2002).    
 How employers react to employment protection 
The effects of EPL on firms’ behavior are likely to be mediated by several factors.  As 
discussed above,  stringent EPL would not constrain firm performance and job creation if 
workers fully valued the benefits of employment protection and were willing to trade 
them off for greater effort or a lower monetary compensation.
4  But if the costs associated 
with stringent EPL are too high to be fully transferred into lower wages or higher 
productivity, or if workers’ organization resist wage reductions, then they may lead to 
lower job creation and possibly lower investment in new technologies.  
Temporary versus regular workers.  When employment protection legislation is less 
stringent than legislation for regular workers, firms may be encouraged to hire more 
workers on a temporary basis to increase workforce flexibility.  Indeed many countries 
around the world have liberalized temporary contracts in the past decade – expanding the 
list of jobs allowed under temporary contracts, lengthening their maximum duration 
and/or allowing temporary work agencies to operate.  Evidence from France, Spain, 
Argentina, Peru, and Colombia suggests that the asymmetric liberalization of temporary 
contracts, while leaving in place strict regulations for regular contracts, has led to 
significant shifts of labor demand in favor of temporary employment.  In Spain temporary 
employment reached almost one-third of the total workforce after the reform of 
temporary contracts in the mid-1980s.  In Peru, the liberalization of temporary 
employment in the early 1990s led to an increase in temporary employment from 20 
percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000.  In Colombia there was a similar large increase and 
in South Africa more than 90 percent of large firms are reported to make greater use of 
temporary workers to increase flexibility of the workforce.  Interestingly, while about 
one-third of formal micro-enterprises in South Africa use temporary employment, the 
share is less than 10 percent among informal firms (Chandra and others, 2001).   
 
Liberalizing temporary contracts, while leaving in place strict regulations on regular 
contracts tends to reinforce the inequality in the labor market (see OECD, 2004).  Firms 
will have stronger incentives to hire more workers at the entry level and employ them for 
a limited period, without giving them a regular position thereafter.  This increases job 
turnover but not necessarily overall employment or productivity, because the additional 
hires will be accompanied by additional layoffs at the end of the temporary contracts, and 
                                                 
4   Labor protection provisions can be justified on the grounds that workers are risk averse and that 
they do not have the possibility to privately insure themselves against labor market uncertainty or prefer to 
trade off lower earnings for better working conditions. See Bertola (2004). 
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the liberalization of temporary employment was partially reversed after a few years 
because of the large expansion of temporary employment and, in Spain, net job creation 




The size of firms. Stringent EPL is also likely to influence firms differently depending on 
their characteristics.  Evidence suggests that stringent EPL is associated with larger 
proportions of self-employed, informal firms, and small firms.
6  Indeed, firms facing high 
labor adjustment constraints may either remain small—and more or less informal in 
developing countries or exempt from employment regulations in several industrial 
countries — or move to a higher scale, at which hiring and firing costs play a smaller role 
in total expected adjustment costs.  In many developing and transition economies, larger 
firms are also able to obtain special treatment from local or national authorities to 
circumvent rigid rules.
7 
Greater use of training.  Firms facing high labor adjustment costs may make greater use 
of training to adapt the workforce to the needs of new technologies (see e.g. Cappelli, 
2000).  Training may be a valid alternative to hiring and firing only under certain 
conditions.  In particular, when employment protection is strict and wages are fairly 
compressed, training may be a valid option to upgrade the skills of the workforce because 
there is a greater wedge between productivity and wages at high skill levels.
8  T h e  
combination of wage compression and high labor adjustment costs – which is common in 
many countries -- tend to favor a process of competence accumulation based on firm-
supported training and on-the-job learning.  In this context, training may compensate for 
the negative effect that labor regulations may have on the optimal allocation of workers 
(as illustrated in the case of Germany in Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). In addition, firms 
may use training to make sure workers have adequate skills to be able to adopt flexible 
work practices
9 (Gittleman et al., 1998). In turn, internal flexibility is a strategy which 
can be a substitute as well as a complement to a strategy of involuntary turnover within 
firms (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). 
                                                 
5   See Blanchard and Landier (2001) for France; Hopenhayn (2004) for Argentina, Dolado, 
García-Serrano, and Jimeno (2001) for Spain, Saavedra and Torero (2004) for Peru and Kugler (2004) for 
Colombia.  
6   See Nicoletti and others (2001) on self-employment; Nicoletti and others (2001) for the 
evidence on firm size; and Scarpetta and others (2002) for the evidence on size of entrant firms and 
post-entry expansion.  
7   In Russia many large firms have circumvented strict regulations by encouraging workers to 
leave the firm voluntarily, through wage arrears, prolonged administrative leaves, reduced hours, 
and other forms of deteriorating working conditions.  With no future in the firm and no source of 
income, many workers eventually quit (World Bank, 2003).  
8   Lynch (1994), Blinder and Krueger (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) offer some evidence 
of more firm-sponsored training in more coordinated countries. 
9   Flexible work practices include movement away from hierarchical management structures e.g. 
through improving workers’ input into managerial decisions, workers’ coordination through occupational 
lines, etc. (see Gittleman et al., 1998). 
  83. The  data 
Our empirical analysis relies on three different datasets.  Our de jure indicators of   
employment protection legislation are drawn from the World Bank Doing Business 
Database, which provides detailed information on the labor legislation in more than 140 
countries around the world.  Information on employers’ perceptions on labor regulations 
and on they responses is drawn from two large surveys  –  the World Bank Business 
Environment surveys and the Investment Climate surveys.   
Measuring the stringency of employment protection legislation 
We focus on two separate aspects of employment protection legislation: that concerning 
regular contracts and that pertaining to temporary contracts.
10 
Regulation of regular employment  
Drawing from the Doing business database of the World Bank, we focus on the following 
variables to characterize individual protection against dismissal for workers with regular 
contracts:  
•  Procedural requirements.  They refer to the process that has to be followed from 
the decision to lay off a worker to the actual termination of the contract.  They 
include: 1) the grounds for dismissal   --  whether it is unfair to terminate the 
employment contract without cause; whether there is a list of “fair” grounds for 
dismissal; and whether redundancy is considered a “fair” ground for dismissal; 2) 
the delay before the notice of dismissal can start (for example, because there has 
to be a series of previous warnings); 3) whether a third party must be notified or 
consulted; and whether dismissal cannot proceed without the approval of a third 
party; 4) whether the law mandates retraining or replacement prior of dismissal; 
5) whether there are priority rules to dismissal or layoffs; 6) and whether there are 
priority rules applying to re-employment.  
•  Notice period required by law for the dismissal of one redundant worker in 
manufacturing with twenty years of tenure.  
•  Severance payment (including mandatory indemnity) for the dismissal of one 
redundant worker in manufacturing with twenty years of tenure.  
                                                 
10   In the Doing Business database, EPL regulations are defined on the basis of a representative 
worker.  The work has the following characteristics: (i) he is a non-executive full-time employee who has 
been working in the same firm for 20 years; (ii) his salary plus benefits equal the country's GNP per worker 
during the entire period of employment; (iii) he has a non-working wife and two children, and the family 
has always resided in the country’s most populous city. The employer has the following characteristics: (i) 
it is a manufacturing company wholly owned by nationals; (ii) its legal domicile and its main place of 
business is the country’s most populous city; (iii) it has 250 workers; and (iv) it abides by every law and 
regulation, but does not grant workers more prerogatives than are legally mandated.  See World Bank 
(2004c) from more details and http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/.  
  9Regulation of temporary employment 
Indicators of the stringency of EPL for temporary contracts refer to: 1) the “objective” 
reasons under which they could be offered – only for temporary jobs such as temporary 
vacancies to replace a regular worker; training contracts, seasonal work; 2) the maximum 
cumulated duration of a contract. 
Detailed indicators for the different components of employment protection have been 
first normalized from 0 to 1 from the least to the most restrictive in the country sample.  
They have then been aggregated into two synthetic indicators for regular and temporary 
contracts and an overall indicator of EPL.  The aggregation process follows previous 
studies (e.g. OECD, 1994, 1999, 2004) and is largely based on simple averages of 
detailed regulatory aspects (see Annex 1 for details).  Table 1 presents the synthetic 
indicators for all the countries in the sample used in our empirical analysis.    As a simple 
validation test, our two synthetic indicators are highly correlated with those recently 
produced by the OECD (2004).
11  
Three main points emerge from the synthetic indicators in Table 1.  First, there is a large 
heterogeneity of regulatory settings within each of the world regions.  Whether in the 
industrial country group or any other region, countries differ significantly in the 
stringency of their labor regulations. Secondly and bearing in mind this within-group 
variance, some regions tend to have a larger concentration of countries with strict 
regulations, in particular Europe and Central Asia, South Asia and Latin America.  Third, 
many low-income countries have labor regulations that mimic or even exceed those of 
industrial economies—even if the latter have approached these conditions only gradually 
during their process of development.  Indeed, while one might have expected a positive 
relation between the level of mandated labor protection and income across countries (i.e. 
labor protection is a normal good), the relationship is in fact weakly negative across our 
sample of countries. 
Table 1 The synthetic indicators of the stringency of employment protection for 
regular and temporary employment 










Sub-Saharan Africa (SAS)             
Botswana 0.20  24  0.40  44  0  1 
Cameroon 0.67  75  0.67  80  0.67  60 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.53  55  0.22  12  0.83  70 
Ethiopia 0.57  63  0.40  44  0.75  63 
Ghana 0.18  17  0.35  31  0  1 
                                                 
11   In order to check the quality of our index, we compare it to the new indicator derived by the 
OECD (2004). The comparison can be made for 15 industrial and transition countries: Canada, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. The correlation between our weighted index for overall 
employment regulation with the relevant overall OECD index is statistically significant at 1 per cent level 
(correlation coefficient= 0.82). 
  10Kenya 0.19  19  0.38  39  0  1 
Madagascar 0.19  19  0.22  12  0.17  31 
Malawi 0.20  24  0.41  47  0  1 
Namibia 0.21  27  0.41  47  0  1 
Nigeria 0.15  11  0.30  23  0  1 
Senegal 0.55  60  0.43  53  0.67  60 
South Africa  0.41  43  0.33  30  0.5  40 
Tanzania 0.47  46  0.44  56  0.5  40 
Uganda 0.08  4  0.15  4  0  1 
Zambia 0.23  29  0.46  59  0  1 
Zimbabwe 0.14  9  0.28  20  0  1 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)          
Cambodia 0.20  24  0.39  42  0  1 
China 0.29  31  0.57  72  0  1 
Indonesia 0.58  67  0.41  47  0.75  63 
Malaysia 0.15  11  0.30  23  0  1 
Philippines 0.16  13  0.32  27  0  1 
Singapore 0.05  1  0.11  1  0  1 
Thailand 0.57  63  0.30  23  0.83  70 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA)          
Albania 0.17  16  0.35  31  0  1 
Armenia 0.37  39  0.49  64  0.25  32 
Azerbaijan 0.53  55  0.47  61  0.58  50 
Belarus 0.50  51  0.41  47  0.58  50 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0.59  69  0.35  31  0.83  70 
Bulgaria 0.34  35  0.17  5  0.5  40 
Croatia 0.67  75  0.60  77  0.75  63 
Czech Republic  0.30 32 0.27  19  0.33  38 
Estonia 0.19  19  0.39  42  0  1 
Georgia 0.37  39  0.50  66  0.25  32 
Hungary 0.19  19  0.29  21  0.08  28 
Kazakhstan 0.11  7  0.22  12  0  1 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.50  51  0.41  47  0.58  50 
Latvia 0.66  73  0.49  64  0.83  70 
Lithuania 0.47  46  0.36  37  0.58  50 
Macedonia, FYR  0.48 48 0.46  59  0.5  40 
Moldova 0.54  57  0.50  66  0.58  50 
Poland 0.18  17  0.35  31  0  1 
Romania 0.79  83  0.70  81  0.88  76 
Russian Federation  0.16  13  0.24  16  0.08  28 
Serbia and Montenegro  0.33  34  0.40  44  0.25  32 
Slovak Republic  0.13  8  0.18  6  0.08  28 
Slovenia 0.42  44  0.59  76  0.25  32 
Turkey 0.42  44  0.35  31  0.5  40 
Ukraine 0.67  75  0.76  83  0.58  50 
Uzbekistan 0.54  57  0.50  66  0.58  50 
  11Industrial Countries          
Canada 0.09  5  0.18  6  0  1 
France 0.66  73  0.44  56  0.88  76 
Germany 0.56  61  0.63  79  0.5  40 
Italy 0.57  63  0.38  39  0.75  63 
Portugal 0.60  70  0.70  81  0.5  40 
Spain 0.62  71  0.32  27  0.92  78 
Sweden 0.36  38  0.48  63  0.25  32 
United Kingdom  0.09  5  0.19  8  0  1 
United States  0.07  2  0.13  2  0  1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC)          
Argentina 0.51  53  0.43  53  0.58  50 
Bolivia 0.56  61  0.37  38  0.75  63 
Brazil 0.68  79  0.52  70  0.83  70 
Chile 0.28  30  0.31  26  0.25  32 
Colombia 0.48  48  0.21  11  0.75  63 
Costa Rica  0.35  36  0.19  8  0.5  40 
Dominican Republic  0.22  28  0.44  56  0  1 
Ecuador 0.37  39  0.41  47  0.33  38 
El Salvador  0.67  75  0.43  53  0.92  78 
Guatemala 0.49  50  0.24  16  0.75  63 
Haiti 0.14  9  0.29  21  0  1 
Honduras 0.07  2  0.13  2  0  1 
Mexico 0.74  81  0.57  72  0.92  78 
Nicaragua 0.16  13  0.32  27  0  1 
Panama 0.73  80  0.53  71  0.92  78 
Peru 0.58  67  0.57  72  0.58  50 
Uruguay 0.35  36  0.20  10  0.5  40 
Venezuela, RB  0.54  57  0.25  18  0.83  70 
Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA)          
Algeria 0.40  42  0.22  12  0.58  50 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.31  33  0.62  78  0  1 
Tunisia 0.57  63  0.47  61  0.67  60 
South Asia          
Bangladesh 0.19  19  0.38  39  0  1 
Bhutan 0.63  72  0.35  31  0.92  78 
India 0.51  53  0.51  69  0.5  40 
Pakistan 0.75  82  0.57  72  0.94  83 
See Annex 1 for an explanation of the construction of these indexes. 
Employers’ perception of the stringency of employment protection legislation 
Micro level data on firm characteristics, employers’ perception about labor regulations 
and their behavior are drawn from two separate business establishment surveys. The 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES, World Bank 2000) contains a large 
  12number of countries but a relatively small sample of firm in each country, while the 
Investment Climate Survey (ICS) has a relatively smaller country sample but covers 
many more firms in each country (see below). These two datasets complete each other for 
our purpose: the WBES enables us to see whether the simple relation between 
perceptions and de jure labor regulations is consistent across a large number of 
developing, transition and industrial countries. The ICS, on the other hand, provides 
information that enables us to carry out a deeper analysis of the reaction of firms to labor 
regulations. 
World Business Environment Survey 
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES 2000) is a survey of over 10,000 firms 
in 81 countries that examines a wide range of interactions between firms and the State. 
Based on face-to-face interviews with firm managers and owners in late 1999 and early 
2000, the WBES generated measurements in such areas as corruption, judiciary, lobbying 
and the quality of the business environment.
 12   
The main variable of interest in our analysis is the perception that respondents have of 
labor regulations. In the WBES this is measured through the following question: “Please 
judge on a four point scale
13 how problematic are these different regulatory areas for the 
operation and growth of your business (Please do not select more than 4 obstacles as the 
“major”)”. In addition to labor regulations, seven other regulatory aspects are proposed: 
business licensing, customs/foreign trade regulation, foreign currency/exchange 
regulations, environmental regulations, fire/safety regulations, tax 
regulations/administration, and high taxes. 
Through targeted selection and replacement, at least 100 surveys of private firms having 
representative characteristics were completed. In general, these characteristics include the 
following: (i) Sector:  In each country, the sectoral composition in terms of 
manufacturing (including agro-processing) versus services (including commerce) is 
determined by relative contribution to GDP, subject to a 15% minimum for each 
category; (ii) Size: At least 15% of the sample are small firms and 15% are large firms; 
(iii) Ownership: At least 15% of the firms have foreign control. (iv) Exporters:  At least 
15% of firms are exporters, meaning that some significant share of their output is 
exported. (v) Location:  At least 15% of firms are in the category “small city or 
countryside”. 
                                                 
12   The surveys were carried out following the same terms of reference in all countries. The  
questionnaire was translated  as required for each of the countries. It was pre-tested with at least five 
enterprises in each country to assure its appropriateness, adjusting translated phrases to make the survey 
more understandable. The questionnaire was then revised and codified as indicated by pre-testing and 
analysis. A sample frame of private businesses as complete as possible was developed in each country and 
from each a sample of at least 100 firms meeting the distributional criteria approved by the client was 
selected (World Bank, 2000).   
13   Where 1 = no obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle, 3 = moderate obstacle, 4 = major obstacle. 
  13Additional useful variables include (among others): (i) ownership: public ownership 
refers to whether the firm is at least partly owned by the government; (ii) Employment 
expansion: full-time employment increased in the previous three years. 
Investment Climate Survey 
The Investment Climate Survey (ICS) has so far been carried out in 51 developing and 
transition economies. The aim of this survey is to provide quantitative data on investment 
climate which are comparable at the international and regional levels. The survey is 
normally carried out under the auspices of national stakeholders, which could be an 
employers association as in the case of India, a development research institution as in the 
case of China and Ethiopia, an indigenous development agency as in the case of Morocco 
and Pakistan, or the central statistical bureau as was the case in Bolivia.  
Because the priorities of these surveys vary across countries, ICS are not all exactly the 
same. However, in order to make these as comparable as possible, a set of criteria were 
defined: (i) the survey sampling unit is the establishment;
14 (ii) interviews are carried out 
face to face by trained enumerators with establishments’ heads and accountants; (iii) a set 
of core questions – with the same wording - are asked in the same way in all countries;
15 
(iv) there are common rules for sample design. This is the least standardized aspect of the 
surveys. The rules are the following: (i) each country survey contains a minimum set of 
sectors that are shared by a larger number of countries; (ii) major export and/or growth 
industries are adequately represented; (iii) for budget reasons, coverage is limited to areas 
of minimum concentration of activity; (iv) the sample should be representative of the 
sectors and regions it covers (and in particular of the main ones), i.e. each sector and 
region should contain at least 50-100 observations; (v) all samples must be stratified by 
size, sector and location.  Depending on the country, the sample size for most recent ICS 
ranges from 200 to 1500 (depending on the size of the economy). 
From the ICS database we have extracted responses on a specific question concerning 
labor regulations: “Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the 
operation and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge its 
severity on a four-point scale
16”. Eighteen issues are proposed including labor 
regulations.
17 
                                                 
14   In cases where firms with several establishment have consolidated accounts, every effort is made 
to disaggregate. If this is not possible, the unit of observation is the same throughout the questionnaire. 
15   These common questions constitute a well-tested product of past surveys having been pooled and 
consolidated from instruments of FACS, WBES and RPED surveys. Together they constitute 50 to 60 
percent of the full survey instrument, the rest being items generating information for analyzing more 
specialized policy issues. 
16   Where 0 = no obstacle, 1 = minor obstacle, 2 = moderate obstacle, 3 = major obstacle, 4 = very 
severe obstacle. For our purpose and to make the variable consistent across WBES and ICS, we merge 
responses 3 and 4 into the category “major”. 
17   Telecommunications, electricity, transportation, access to land, tax rates, tax administration, 
custom and trade regulations, labor regulations, skills and education of available workers, business 
licensing and operating permits, access to financing, cost of financing, economic and regulatory policy 
  14Moreover, we have used the ICS database to assess firms’ behavior along different 
dimensions, which are useful as controls in the empirical analysis and as possible 
behavioral responses to restrictions in hiring and firing.  The variables include: basic firm 
characteristics; changes in employment over the previous two years
18; whether the firm is 
upgrading its products or production line
19;
  whether the firms hires temporary workers
20; 
and finally whether the firm is providing training to its workers
21 (see section 4 for more 
details on the empirical strategy). 
Table 2 presents the sample sizes and basic characteristics of the firms involved in the 
WBES and ICS surveys and which have provided the information that is relevant to our 
study.  Despite the different country coverage, firms’ characteristics are fairly similar 
across the two surveys, as are the responses of firms concerning labor regulations.   
Across all firms surveyed in both the WBES and the ICS, close to 70 percent of 
respondents in WBES (60 percent in ICS) reported that labor market regulations 
represented an obstacle (minor, moderate, major) to their operation and expansion.   
Around 16 percent report that these regulations are a major obstacle to the operation and 
growth of their business in ICS (14 percent in WBES).   
Table 2: Basic characteristics of the firms in the WBES and ICS databases 
 WBES  ICS 










Proportion of firms that:             
Report EPL as no obstacle  33.4  81  9070  44.1  47  17461 
Report EPL as minor obstacle  28.6  81  9070  21.7  47  17461 
Report EPL as moderate obstacle  23.8  81  9070  18.0  47  17461 
report EPL as major obstacle  14.1  81  9070  16.1  47  17461 
are small (less than 20 employees)  40.7  81  9070  41.7  47  17461 
are medium (21 to 100 employees)  41.5  81  9070  31.9  47  17461 
are large (over 100 employees)  17.8  81  9070  26.4  47  17461 
are owned by the government        10.0  47  17461 
expanded employment  54.4    4664  71.0  47  17140 
upgraded or created a product line  -    -  66.7  39  14043 
provide formal training  -    -  56.1  38  12170 
hire temporary workers  -    -  41.7  38  10837 
            
Average age of firms  18.6  81  9070  16.0  47  17461 
 
4.  The empirical analysis 
Modeling firms’ perceptions 
                                                                                                                                                 
uncertainty, macroeconomic instability, corruption, crime, theft and disorder, anti-competitive or informal 
practices, and legal system/conflict resolution. 
18   Firm increased employment between the previous year and the year before. 
19   Firm developed a major new product line and/or upgraded an existing product line in the previous 
three years. 
20   Dummy = 1 if firms employ temporary workers, 0 otherwise. 
21   Firms report whether they offer formal (beyond “on the job”) training to their regular employees. 
  15In a first stage, we model the determinants of the perception that employers have of labor 
market regulations. Using a generalized ordered logit model,
22 we regress the perception 
of labor regulations on an index of strictness of actual regulations as defined in the law, 
and a set of control variables. We assume that the perception of the strictness of labor 
regulations is a continuous latent variable y* which represents utility or preferences and 
is unobservable:  
ε β + = X y*  X ε ~ standard logistic distribution. 
where β is a K×1 vector and X contains K explanatory variables (described below). While 
y* is not observed, the response to the above question (y) is, and is considered as the 
manifestation of these preferences. y is defined in the following way: 
y = 0 if y* ≤ α1 
y = 1 if α1 < y* ≤α2 
… 
y = 3 if y* > α3 
where αi is an unknown cut point. 
Following the theoretical and empirical background provided in section 2, there are two 
sets of basic explanatory variables which are likely to influence employers’ perceptions: 
(i) firms’ characteristics; (age, size of firm, and ownership); (ii) external conditions, for 
example, enforcement of regulations or economic conditions (captured through the 
country’s income level and region dummies). Firm’s perceptions are also likely to depend 
on the firm’s current situation. We capture this in two ways: (1) by adding the innovating 
history of the firm (whether it upgraded or created a product line in the three year before 
the survey) and (2) by adding whether it increased permanent employment. We then 
introduce in the model our variable of interest: actual de jure employment regulations, 
both as a stand-alone dummy and interacted with the firm’s situation. 
The generalized ordered logit model estimates a set of coefficients (including one for the 
constant) for each of the m - 1 points at which the dependent variable can be 
dichotomized. From this set of k coefficients (Bk), using the logistic cumulative 
distribution, it is straightforward to derive formulas for the probabilities that y will take 
on each of the values 0, 1, ..., m: 
 
        P(y = 0 ) = F( -Xβ1 ) 
                                                 
22   To estimate an ordered logit model, Stata imposes what is called the proportional odds assumption 
on the data. Having tested our model, we concluded that this assumption did not hold. The generalized 
ordered logit model relaxes the proportional odds assumption and allows the effects of the explanatory 
variables to vary with the point at which the categories of the dependent variable are dichotomized 
(Maddala, 1983, p46). 
  16        P(y = j ) = F( -Xβ (j+1) ) - F( -Xβj )        j = 1, ..., m - 1 
        P(y = m ) = 1 - F( -Xβm ) 
 
In specifications which include the innovating history of the firm, it can be argued that 
this variable is likely to be endogenous as the perceptions that employers have of labor 
market regulations may influence their propensity to innovate. This problem can only be 
solved if we are able to find a satisfactory instrument for the innovating history (i.e. a 
variable that is correlated with the innovating history but not with perceptions).  The ICS 
provide information regarding the sources of the firm’s working capital. We measure the 
proportion of capital that comes from formal credit institutions
23 as an indicator for 
access to credit. The instrumental variable estimation is done in two steps, we first 
estimate a first-stage logit regression of the innovating history on firms’ characteristics 
and the instrument. We then include the fitted values of the first stage regression in the 
second stage model (described above) in place of the endogenous variable. To 




Modeling firms’ behavior 
Having shown the extent to which perceived and de jure labor regulations are correlated, 
in a second stage, we model the behavior of firms as a function of their perception of 
labor regulations, actual regulations and firm characteristics. We are interested in the way 
in which firms adapt their behavior to the constraints of labor regulations. In particular 
we look at two choices of firms: 
•  Provision of training. Since regulations make it harder for firms to fire workers, 
they may have an incentive to increase the human capital of their workers by 
offering them training.  
•  Use of temporary employment. As discussed above, the extent to which firms rely 
on temporary workers is likely to depend on the combination of regulations of 
regular employment on the one hand and temporary employment on the other 
hand. 
The independent variable of interest is the degree to which firms find actual regulations 
to be an obstacle to their business. We recognize however that employers’ perceptions of 
labor market regulations are likely to be endogenous to firms’ behavior. We therefore use 
in subsequent specifications our measures of de jure regulations instead of perceptions; 
through the analysis in our first stage described above, we provide an assessment the 
quality of this proxy.  We add combinations of variables measuring the strictness of 
regular and temporary employment regulations. We include these two types of 
                                                 
23 Formal credit institutions are the following: local commercial banks, foreign owned commercial banks, 
leasing arrangement, investment funds, special development financing, other state services, trade credit, 
credit cards, equity, sales of stock. Other sources of capital include: internal funds or retained earnings, 
family, friends, informal sources (e.g. money lenders).  
  17regulations separately because, they are likely to have differential effects on the provision 
of training and the use of temporary workers.  The other control variables are as follows: 
(i) firms’ characteristics (age, size of firm, industry, innovating history, and ownership) 
and (ii) country’s income level.  
The propensity to provide training or use temporary workers is not observed, we only 
observe whether firms have actually provided training or employed temporary workers. 
Moreover, the use of temporary instead of regular employment and the provision of 
training are not independent choices for firms. Depending on the regulatory environment 
in which firms operate, the underlying technology of the firm and its size and other 
salient characteristics, training may be an alternative to the use of temporary workers –
  e.g. when training allows skills adjustment which can alternatively be obtained by 
recruiting temporary workers, or even a complement  –  when it is difficult to recruit 
skilled workers on a temporary basis.   
We therefore test the hypothesis that these two decisions are endogenous and use a 
bivariate probit model to consider training provision and the use of temporary 
employment simultaneously.  In other words, we model the reaction of firms in a 
two-equations model: 
1 1 1 1* ε β + = X y ,   y1 = 1 if y1* > 0, 0 otherwise 
2 2 2 2* ε β + = X y ,   y2 = 1 if y2* > 0, 0 otherwise 
Where y1,2* are two unobservable latent variables representing the propensity to provide 
training and employ temporary workers, and y1,2 the observable reactions of firms, 
namely providing training and employing temporary workers. The random error terms, 
ε1,2 are normally distributed with E[ε1] = E[ε2] = 0, and var[ε1] = var[ε2] = 1 but they 
could be correlated, i.e. cov[ε1, ε2] = ρ.  If a Wald test shows that ρ is not statistically 
different from zero then there is no endogeneity bias and the two models can be estimated 
separately as standard probits.  If however ρ is significantly different from zero and the 
log-likelihood of the bivariate estimate is significantly less than the joint binomial probit 
log-likelihoods, then y1 and y2 are endogenous processes (Bertaut 1998; Greene 2003). 
Wald tests are reported in Tables 7a,b,c and all show that the two processes considered 
here are indeed endogenous (they reject the hypothesis that ρ is equal to zero at the 1 to 5 
percent level of significance), we therefore present results only for the bivariate probit 
model.  
The probabilities that enter the likelihood function are given by the bivariate cumulative 
distribution function (Greene, 2003): 
Prob(Y1 = yi1, Y2 = yi2) = Φ(wi1, wi2, ρi*) 
     =   2 1 i 2 i1
1 2
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zij = βj’Xij  and  wij = (2yij – 1)βj’Xij  with  j = 1, 2 
ρi* = (2yi1 – 1)(2yi2 – 1)ρ 
and 
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Φ is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and φ is the bivariate normal 
density function. 
It can be argued that firms have also the choice of adjusting the number of permanent 
staff. We therefore extend our model to take into account this additional potential 
behavior. The bivariate probit model can be extended to include additional probit 
equations, to become a trivariate, or even multivariate probit model (M-equation model). 
However, the estimation problem is complicated by the fact that, as can be seen from the 
formulae above, M-dimensional Normal integrals have to be evaluated in the likelihood 
function.  The solution commonly used is to evaluate the integrals with the GHK 





The inclusion of the employment protection legislation indicators in our models raises an 
important methodological issue.  These indicators only vary across countries and standard 
errors can be seriously biased downwards (see Moulton, 1990). This is the case, because 
standard errors are likely to be correlated for observations within each country, especially 
when the explanatory variable is auto-correlated over time and/or across different units 
within one country.  All the estimations of this paper therefore take this into 
consideration by relaxing the assumption of independence of observations that is usually 
made; we assume that observations are independent across countries, but not necessarily 
across firms in the same country. In addition, the estimations assume that observations 
may not be identically distributed. The cluster adjustment made to the 
variance-covariance matrix are standard and described in Rogers (1993) and Williams 
(2000).  
5. Results 
In the empirical analysis we test three key hypotheses formulated in the theoretical 
literature and discussed in previous empirical studies.   
•  As shown above, a significant share of firms across many countries find labor 
regulations to be an obstacle to their operation and growth. Do these perceptions 
vary depending on firms’ characteristics, performance and innovation projects?   
                                                 
24 For references and a brief description of the GHK smooth recursive simulator see Greene (2003). 
  19•  We also want to assess whether employers’ perceptions about labor regulations 
are consistent with de jure EPL across countries.  This allows to see whether 
empirical results based on surveys and those based on synthetic indicators of 
formal regulations can be compared.  Even more importantly, assessing the links 
between perceptions and formal regulations can tell us something about 
enforcement of rules in different countries. To the extent these links vary 
depending of firm characteristics and performance, we can shed light on who is 
most affected by a given regulatory setting.    
•  Finally, we link the perceived and formal stringency of labor regulations to two 
possible strategies firms can use to, at least partially, overcome them: making 
greater use of training to adapt the workforce to changes in technology instead of 
recurring to the external labor market; and make greater use of temporary 
employment to increase labor flexibility when regulations of regular contracts are 
too constraining.   
What makes employers worry about labor regulations? 
Table 3 presents the generalized ordered logit regressions of the perceived constraint of 
labor regulations drawing from both the WBES and the ICS samples.
25 In this and in 
Table 4, we present the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability 
that the respondent reports labor regulations as no obstacle or as a major obstacle.
26  In 
the first four columns in Table 3, we only include firms’ characteristics  –  age, size, 
geographical area, and ownership  –  and the country income group as explanatory 
variables of firms’ perception.  Other things being equal, young or small firms appear less 
concerned with labor regulations, while, older, or medium and large firms (more than 20 
employees) are more likely to report that these regulations are an obstacle to their 
business.   
Not surprisingly, firms which are at least partly owned by the government show less 
concern for labor regulations than those completely private.  Large employment 
adjustments in state-owned enterprises often involve large and generous packages 
transferring, at least partially, the adjustment costs to taxpayers.  
The regional dummies and the income group dummies allow to shed some light on the 
different degree of enforcement of regulations across countries.  Given the unavoidable 
major labor reallocation coupled and assisted by large use of early retirement and 
generous mass layoffs schemes in transition economies, it is not surprising to find that, 
other things being equal, firms in these countries appear the least concerned compared to 
other regions (except Middle East and North Africa which is not found to differ 
significantly from firms in transition countries).  The results also suggest that the higher 
                                                 
25   The different specifications use the largest available sample of firms/countries.  However, to 
verify the robustness of results across specifications, we also re-run them on the same maximum common 
sample.  This sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are robust to the use of a smaller common 
sample.  The results are available from the authors upon request.  
26   The estimated marginal probabilities that respondents report minor or moderate constraint (i.e. the 
other two options in the questionnaire of the two surveys) are available from the authors.  
  20the income level of a country, the greater the likelihood that firms find labor regulations 
to be an obstacle to their business, other things being equal.  This may be due to the fact 
that more developed countries have more stringent regulations on labor or that 
enforcement improves with economic development.  We go back to this issue below 
when we introduce formal regulations in the equation.  
In the second set of specifications (columns 5 to 8) in Table 3, we also include controls 
for firm performance: innovation (whether the firm is upgrading its production line or its 
products) and expansion of employment.  Consistently with theory, firms that are 
innovating are more likely to report that labor regulations are a significant source of 
constraint.  Most of the time, innovation involves the adoption of new technologies that 
require new skills and labor regulations, by raising the costs of adjusting the workforce, 
may make it more difficult or costly to do so. The results are not significantly changed 
when controlling for potential endogeneity of this variable (Table A1 in Annex 3). Not 
surprisingly, firms that increased the number of full-time staff are found, other things 
being equal, to be less concerned by labor regulations than others.  The perception about 
labor regulation and the decision to change the workforce are obviously correlated.  We 
use the change in employment to characterize the general performance of the 
firm  (whether it is expanding or downsizing)  and, to reduce the obvious endogeneity 
problem, we use the lagged values of the employment change.  Moreover, results in 
Tables 3 and 4 show that all other coefficients are robust to the inclusion of this variable.     
In Table 4 we turn to the effects of formal regulations on employers’ perceptions.  We 
use the same basic controls discussed above and add our EPL indicators in levels and in 
interactions with firm size and changes in employment.  The main result is that even 
controlling for firm characteristics, income per capita and geographical location of the 
countries, de jure regulations are consistent with employers’ perceptions: firms facing 
stricter EPL are less likely than others to report that labor regulations are not an obstacle 
to their business, and are more likely to report that regulations are a major obstacle to 
their operation (columns 1, 2, 5, and 6). We should note here that the effect of countries’ 
income level does not disappear (results not shown in Table 4): firms in countries with 
higher income level are more likely to report that labor regulations are a constraint, even 
controlling for the strictness of actual de jure labor regulations. 
As stressed above, the link between actual regulations and perceptions of regulations is 
likely to be influenced by firm’s characteristics and behavior.  This is analyzed by 
allowing the coefficients of EPL to vary depending on firm size (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8).  
While all firms perceive regulations more constraining in countries with strict EPL, in 
both the WBES and especially in the ICS data, medium-sized firms are more severely 
affected (the coefficients on medium-size firms are significantly larger in absolute value 
than coefficients for small and large firms).  This is consistent with the hypothesis of a 
“forgotten middle” (e.g. Scarpetta et al., 2002; Batra et al., 2003).  Small firms are often 
exempted from certain aspects of labor regulations (Boeri and Jimeno, 2003).  In many 
countries where enforcement of regulations is limited, small firms do not comply, 
remaining invisible to regulators and inspectors.  For large firms, hiring and firing costs 
  21play a smaller role in total expected costs of adjusting the workforce.
27  In addition, they 
are often able to overcome at least partially these costs by obtaining special treatment 
from the local or national authorities or by exploiting their strong bargaining power.  
Firms of medium size are sufficiently large to be visible to the authorities and thus unable 
to avoid regulations, but not large enough to dilute the associated costs of these 
regulations via internal mobility or special arrangement with the authorities.   
We also test whether the sensitivity of employers’ perception to de jure EPL varies 
depending on firms’ performance (expanding or not) and innovation (Table 4, columns 9 
to 12).  While there is no evidence that firms’ expansion influences the link between 
perception and EPL, firms which have upgraded their production line or created new 
products are more likely to report more severe constraints to regulations in countries with 
stringent EPL.
28  Again this confirms that EPL may be particularly problematic when 
firms have to change the skill composition of the workforce to better use new 
technologies and production process. Put in another way, strict EPL may reduce 
incentives for firms to invest in new technologies or develop new products with 
potentially negative effects on aggregate productivity and growth potential.  
Do training and temporary employment allow firms to overcome strict EPL ? 
Strict labor regulations are likely to influence firms’ management of labor.  We expect 
that stringent hiring and firing regulations will give incentives for firms to make greater 
use of training, other things being equal (see also Young, 2003).  At the same time, if 
EPL is stringent we expect firms to make greater use of temporary employment to 
increase their adaptability to demand fluctuations, especially if regulations for temporary 
employment are relatively less stringent than those for regular employment.  
Tables 5 and 6  present the univariate probabilities of providing training or use temporary 
employment drawn from the bivariate probit, while Table 7 (a, b and c) presents the 
probabilities for the four different possible combinations of training and temporary 
employment decisions. Table 7a focuses on specifications that include the basic controls 
for firms’ characteristics and external conditions; Table 7b extends the analysis to include 
EPL for regular and temporary contracts; and finally Table 7c looks at the effects of 
asymmetric EPL for regular and temporary workers on training and use of temporary 
contracts.  We construct dummy variables that identify the four possible combinations: 
strict temporary and strict regular – strict-TER-strict-PER; strict-TER-lax-RER, lax-TER-
lax-RER, lax-TER-strict-RER. 
29     
A number of results emerge: 
                                                 
27   Indeed, the incidence of strict EPL on total labor adjustment costs may decline with the size of the 
firm, as larger ones may more easily reallocate labor within them and spread these costs over a larger 
capital stock. 
28   While the coefficients of “Overall EPL and expanding employment” is not significantly different 
from that of “Overall EPL and contracting employment”, the coefficients of “Overall EPL and Innovator” 
and “Overall EPL and Not innovator” are significantly different from each other. 
29   The strictness of regulations is defined by comparing regulations across countries in two ways: (i) 
values below (above or equal to) the median value for each variable and (ii) values below (above or equal 
to) the mean value for each variable. 
  22•  Firms that perceive regulations as constraining are somewhat more likely to use 
temporary workers and training to adjust the workforce (Table 5, column 1; Table 
6, column 1).  More interestingly, firms being constrained by labor regulations 
have a stronger probability to both provide training and use temporary 
employment than neither or one but not the other (Table 7a).   
•  While temporary employment is more prominently used by mid-sized firms, 
rather than small or large firms, training is more diffused in medium and large 
firms (Tables 5 and 6).  At the same time, medium and large sized firms are more 
likely to provide training and not use temporary employment – controlling for 
their perception of regulations – than smaller firms.  Medium and large firms are 
also less likely to use temporary employment without training (Table 7a).  All in 
all, training is more frequent amongst medium and large firms, while the use of 
temporary workers is more diffused amongst small firms. Extending the model to 
include the strategy of not increasing permanent employment (Table A2 in Annex 
3), the pattern is unchanged for medium and large firms. Small firms are found to 
favor stable or decreasing employment over the use of temporary workers and 
especially of training. Compared to medium and large firms, small firms are less 
likely to use all three strategies (Table A3 in Annex 3).  
•  Firms that are upgrading their production process or introducing new product 
lines are more likely to use temporary employment and, especially they provide 
more training (Tables 5 and 6).  Again, they are more likely to use both than 
neither and more likely to use training but not temporary employment than vice 
versa (Table 7a).  As could be expected, they are also less likely to decrease or 
keep employment stable (Table A2). 
•  Turning to de jure regulations, we find that EPL for regular contracts has a strong 
effect on firms’ decision to provide training and make greater use of temporary 
employment.  Moreover, more stringent regular employment regulations are 
found to discourage firms to decrease or keep employment stable, although the 
effect is small. By contrast, EPL for temporary contracts does not discriminate 
firms’ behavior significantly
30 (columns 2 and 3 in Tables 5 and 6; Table 7b).    
•  Firms’ reaction also depends on the relative importance of regular and temporary 
employment regulations.  Lowering temporary while leaving in place strict 
regulations for regular employment does not change significantly the probability 
of providing training.  Not surprisingly, firms facing strict regulations for 
temporary contracts but lax regulations for regular contracts are less likely to hire 
temporary workers instead of regular workers, although this result is based on 
weak evidence (Table 6, columns 4 and 5).  In addition, facing stringent regular 
and temporary employment regulations discourages firms to lower or keep 
employment stable (Table A2). 
                                                 
30   This may also be due to the fact that our indicators for temporary EPL are limited and do not cover 
certain aspects of the regulatory system (e.g. they do not consider temporary work agencies and procedural 
inconveniences for setting up a temporary contract).  
  23•  The stringency of regular employment regulations appears to be what really 
discriminates between the provision of training and the use of temporary workers 
(Table 7c). Firms facing stringent employment regulations for regular workers are 
more likely to use both instruments. In addition, there is some evidence that firms 
in these countries tend to prefer training to employing temporary workers. There 
is also some evidence that increasing the stringency of temporary employment 
regulations push firms towards making greater use of training instead of 
employment workers under temporary contracts. (Table 7c). 
Overall, these results suggest that liberalizing temporary employment regulations while 
leaving in place strict regulations for regular employment may not lead to a substitution 
of training for more temporary employment.  Most likely firms will expand both.  In 
other words, at least in our sample of developing and transition economies, training 
seems to be the main reaction of firms to strict regulations on regular contracts, while the 
use of temporary employment is a complement for larger firms, while an alternative 
solution for smaller firms that have difficulties in providing training.  
6. Concluding  remarks 
In this paper we look at how employment protection legislation is perceived by 
employers in a wide range of industrial, developing and transition economies.  We draw 
from harmonized firm surveys compiled by the World Bank and compare the results from 
these surveys with indicators of de jure labor laws.  We also assess how employers react 
when constrained by strict labor regulations.  In particular, we look at whether they make 
greater use of on-the-job training instead of hiring and firing workers to upgrade the skills 
of the workforce, or whether they use more temporary employment to enhance the 
adaptability of the workforce to the evolution of demand.   
Our main results can be summarized as follows: 
•  Employers’ perceptions are broadly consistent with de jure labor regulations.  In 
a large sample of developing, transition and industrial countries, employers’ 
concerns about labor market regulations are closely matched by the relative 
stringency of de jure labor laws.  In countries with labor regulations are more 
stringent from an international perspective, a larger number of employers report 
that these legislations are a major or severe constraint to their operation, even 
after controlling for factors that may influence the varying degree of law 
enforcement. 
•  Not all firms are affected in the same way by strict labor regulations.  Medium-
size firms are the ones most severely affected.  This is probably because in many 
countries where enforcement of regulations is limited small firms do not comply, 
remaining invisible to regulators and inspectors.  And for large firms, hiring and 
firing costs play a smaller role in total expected costs of adjusting the workforce.  
By contrast, firms of medium size are sufficiently large to be visible to the 
authorities and thus unable to avoid regulations, but not large enough to use 
  24internal mobility as an alternative to hiring and firing or obtain special 
arrangements with the authorities to dilute the associated costs.   
•  Innovating firms  –  those that have upgraded their production process or their 
products  --  are more likely to face severe constraints from strict labor 
regulations.  This points to the importance of labor regulations for innovation 
adoption of new technology and potentially long-term growth.      
•  Firms react to strict employment regulations by investing more in training and 
making greater use of temporary employment.  Not all firms can use these 
strategies, though.  Medium and large firms tend to use both training and 
temporary employment, while small firms tend to rely more on the use of 
temporary employment when facing strict regulations.  Innovating firms make 
greater use of training than temporary employment to upgrade skills. 
All in all, this paper suggests that labor laws have an impact on firms’ performance.  
Medium-size firms  --    those that often have the greatest potential for expansion and 
creating more jobs – are the most severely affected as are innovating firms that require 
adjustment in the workforce to match the requirements of new technologies.  Training 
and temporary employment are used to circumvent the costs associated with strict labor 
regulations for regular contracts, but again not all firms can take advantage of these 
strategies.   
For the empirical research agenda, the good news is that de jure indicators of the 
stringency of labor regulations are broadly consistent with employers’ survey data.   
Hence results from studies relying on either one or the other type of information can be 
compared and used for informing policy makers.  But our results clearly suggest that EPL 
affects firms differently, depending on their characteristics and performance. And 
although some of them use training or temporary employment to compensate for the high 
costs associated with EPL, we do not know how costly these strategies are for firms and 
their job creation potential.  These are issues that deserve a closer look in future empirical 
work.  
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Table 3: Firms’ characteristics and perception of strictness of labor regulations 
(Marginal effects from Generalized Ordered Logit Model) 

















Age (Less than 5 years old)             
5 to 15 years old  -0.035*  0.004  -0.018 0.005**  -0.012  0.004**  -0.019  0.006* 
 (0.014  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.012) (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.003) 
16 or more  -0.069**  0.011+  0.005 0.009**  0.018  0.007* 0.011  0.010** 
 (0.019  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.003)  (0.020) (0.003)  (0.022)  (0.004) 
Ownership (Public)  0.059**  -0.010**  0.022 -0.008**  0.012  -0.007**  0.029  -0.011** 
 (0.017  (0.003)  (0.021)  (0.002)  (0.022) (0.002)  (0.024)  (0.003) 
Size (Less than 20 employees)            
20 to 100 employees  -0.081**  0.015**  -0.095** 0.014**  -0.071**  0.011**  -0.096**  0.017** 
 (0.021)  (0.004)  (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.022) (0.003)  (0.023)  (0.004) 
More than 100 
employees 
-0.106** 0.004  -0.177** 0.020**  -0.156** 0.016**  -0.178**  0.023** 
 (0.027)  (0.004)  (0.027)  (0.005)  (0.027) (0.004)  (0.027)  (0.005) 
Region (ECA)              
SSA -0.312**  0.046+  -0.125  0.049+ -0.230**  0.042*  -0.141  0.057* 
 (0.067)  (0.026)  (0.094)  (0.025)  (0.060) (0.017)  (0.093)  (0.028) 
EAP -0.112  0.017  -0.185**  0.055** -0.175**  0.044**  -0.192**  0.064** 
 (0.076)  (0.016)  (0.056)  (0.012)  (0.057) (0.010)  (0.056)  (0.014) 
INL -0.164*  0.048*             
 (0.080)  (0.023)             
LAC -0.21**  0.056*  -0.192  0.107*  -0.154 0.076+  -0.206  0.128* 
 (0.057)  (0.026)  (0.128)  (0.054)  (0.117) (0.040)  (0.128)  (0.063) 
MENA -0.012  -0.008  -0.085** 0.023**      -0.094**  0.028** 
  (0.139) (0.010)  (0.032) (0.006)     (0.034  (0.007) 
SAS -0.529**  0.173**  -0.272**  0.057*      -0.291**  0.070* 
  (0.033) (0.058)  (0.064) (0.027)     (0.062)  (0.032) 
Country income level (Low)             
Lower Middle   -0.193**  0.040+  -0.121* 0.021  -0.124*  0.018  -0.126*  0.023 
 (0.062)  (0.021)  (0.057)  (0.014)  (0.054) (0.012)  (0.059)  (0.016) 
Upper Middle or high   -0.211**  0.031  -0.243** 0.046  -0.238**  0.039  -0.246**  0.053 
 (0.065)  (0.020)  (0.086)  (0.033)  (0.084) (0.027)  (0.085)  (0.038) 
Innovator       -0.076**  0.007**     
       (0.015)  (0.002)     
Expanded  employment           0.047**  -0.005** 




















Predicted probability at 
the mean 
0.335 0.141  0.441 0.161 0.440 0.169  0.440  0.161 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Where relevant, base categories of dummies are indicated in parentheses in italics. + significant at 10%, * 
significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All estimations control for country clustering. Innovator = Upgraded or created product line. ECA = Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia; SSA, Sub-Saharan Africa;  EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; INL = Industrial countries; LAC = Latin America and the 




                                                 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Table 5: The determinants of training provision (Marginal 
effects from the Bivariate Probit model) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Perceptions (No obstacle)          
Minor obstacle  0.011         
 (0.018)         
Moderate obstacle  0.061         
 (0.022)**        
Major obstacle  0.058         
  (0.038)      
Age (Less than 5 years old)       
5 to 15 years old  0.012  0.009  0.008  0.013  0.013 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
16 or more  -0.043  -0.026  -0.052  -0.025  -0.023 
  (0.032) (0.024) (0.030)+  (0.026) (0.025) 
Ownership  (Public)  0.075 0.055 0.078 0.048 0.050 
 (0.026)** (0.028)+  (0.024)**  (0.024)*  (0.026)+ 
Innovator  0.143 0.168 0.137 0.176 0.182 
  (0.034)** (0.025)** (0.037)** (0.024)** (0.025)** 
Size (Less than 20 employees)       
20 to 100 employees  0.181  0.165  0.192  0.160  0.160 
  (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.020)** 
More than 100 employees  0.287 0.263 0.303 0.260 0.259 
  (0.021)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.021)** 
Sector  (Manufacturing)  -0.024 -0.011 -0.012 -0.028 -0.028 
  (0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Country income level (Low income)      
Lower Middle income   0.138  0.163  0.137  0.169  0.163 
  (0.062)*  (0.060)** (0.065)*  (0.057)** (0.065)* 
Upper Middle income or high income    0.317 0.351 0.324 0.370 0.363 
  (0.056)** (0.052)** (0.054)** (0.046)** (0.049)** 
Labor regulations indexes       
Regular employment    0.614       
   (0.127)**       
Temporary  employment    0.095    
    (0.100)    
Regulatory mix – median (Low TER and low RER)      
High TER and High RER        0.215   
       (0.053)**   
Low TER and High RER        0.219   
       (0.050)**   
High TER and Low RER        0.122+   
       (0.063)   
Regulatory mix – mean (Low TER and low RER)      
High TER and High RER          0.185 
      (0.052)** 
Low TER and High RER          0.210 
      (0.049)** 
High TER and Low RER          0.014 
      (0.079) 
Observations (number of countries)  9676 (38) 
Predicted probability at the mean  0.568  0.570  0.569  0.570  0.570 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (and adjusted for clustering on country). + = significant at 10%; * = significant at 
5%; ** = significant at 1%. Where relevant, base categories of dummies are indicated in parentheses in italics. Data source: 
ICS. 
  28Table 6: The determinants of the use if temporary workers used (Marginal 
effects from the Bivariate Probit model)  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Perceptions (No obstacle)           
Minor obstacle  0.038         
 (0.022)+         
Moderate obstacle  0.051         
 (0.026)+         
Major obstacle  0.089         
 (0.035)*         
Age (Less than 5 years old)           
5 to 15 years old  0.052  0.047  0.047  0.048  0.052 
 (0.017)**  (0.018)**  (0.018)**  (0.017)**  (0.017)** 
16 or more  0.080  0.086  0.078  0.086  0.093 
 (0.044)+  (0.042)*  (0.042)+  (0.039)*  (0.038)* 
Ownership (Public)  0.041  0.025  0.040  0.028  0.031 
 (0.036  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.030) 
Innovator 0.048  0.061  0.055  0.068  0.053 
 (0.028)+  (0.026)*  (0.027)*  (0.024)**  (0.024)* 
Size (Less than 20 employees)           
20 to 100 employees  0.066  0.054  0.069  0.058  0.064 
 (0.015)**  (0.017)**  (0.017)**  (0.016)**  (0.016)** 
More than 100 employees 0.032  0.018  0.039  0.022  0.029 
 (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.037) 
Sector (Manufacturing)  0.094  0.105  0.092  0.097  0.092 
 (0.044)*  (0.045)*  (0.049)+  (0.047)*  (0.046)* 
Country income level (Low income)           
Lower Middle income   0.047  0.063  0.053  0.064  0.095 
 (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.081)  (0.077)  (0.076) 
Upper Middle income or high income   0.177  0.207  0.182  0.203  0.199 
 (0.073)*  (0.073)**  (0.081)*  (0.077)**  (0.081)* 
Labor regulations indexes           
Regular employment    0.319       
   (0.140)*       
Temporary employment      -0.070     
     (0.126)     
Regulatory mix – median (Low TER and low RER)         
High TER and High RER        0.056   
       (0.070)   
Low TER and High RER        0.066   
       (0.079)   
High TER and Low RER        -0.117   
       (0.117)   
Regulatory mix – mean (Low TER and low RER)         
High TER and High RER          0.070 
         (0.080) 
Low TER and High RER          -0.006 
         (0.072) 
High TER and Low RER          -0.165 
         (0.092)+ 
Observations (number of countries)  9676 (38) 
Predicted probability at the mean  0.424  0.426  0.426  0.426  0.425 
Standard errors in parentheses (and adjusted for clustering on country). Where relevant, base categories of dummies are 
indicated in parentheses in italics. + = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%.Data source: ICS.  
  29Table 7a: The determinants of training provision and use of temporary 
workers (Marginal effects from the Bivariate Probit model) 
 Provides  training 
and employs 
temporary workers










 Does not provide 
training and does 
not employ 
temporary workers
Perceptions (No obstacle)         
Minor obstacle  0.027  0.011  -0.016  -0.022 
 (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
Moderate obstacle  0.057  -0.006  0.005  -0.055 
 (0.020)**  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.017)** 
Major obstacle  0.079  0.010  -0.021  -0.068 
 (0.029)**  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.023)** 
Age (Less than 5 years old)         
5 to 15 years old  0.035  0.017  -0.023  -0.029 
 (0.011)**  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.012)* 
16 or more  0.026  0.053  -0.069  -0.010 
 (0.031)  (0.022)**  (0.025)**  (0.031) 
Ownership (Public)  0.057  -0.016  0.018  -0.060 
 (0.021)**  (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.019)** 
Innovator 0.086  -0.038  0.057  -0.105 
 (0.024)**  (0.015)*  (0.025)*  (0.026)** 
Size (Less than 20 employees)         
20 to 100 employees  0.117  -0.052  0.064  -0.130 
 (0.014)**  (0.013)**  (0.017)**  (0.015)** 
More than 100 employees  0.140  -0.108  0.147  -0.179 
 (0.026)**  (0.018)**  (0.030)**  (0.022)** 
Sector (Manufacturing)  0.044  0.050  -0.068  -0.026 
 (0.029)  (0.024)*  (0.030)*  (0.031) 
Country income level (Low income)         
Lower Middle income   0.084  -0.036  0.054  -0.101 
 (0.059)  (0.033)  (0.046)  (0.059)+ 
Upper Middle income or high income   0.263  -0.086  0.054  -0.231 
 (0.072)**  (0.023)**  (0.048)  (0.045)** 
        
Observations (number of countries)  9676 (38) 
Predicted probability at the mean  0.259  0.165  0.309  0.267 
Wald test for rho = 0  Chi2(1) = 6.612; Prob > chi2 = 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses (and adjusted for clustering on country). Where relevant, base categories of dummies are 
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  36Annex 1: Construction of Employment Protection Legislation Indexes 
The indexes are calculated from the raw data provided in the Doing Business Database (2005). All 
the variables range between 0 and 1. They are either zero-one dummies (no/yes) or they are 
normalized over the sample. Variables for which higher values (x) represent looser regulations are 






x − =  while variables for which higher 
values represent stricter regulations are normalized in the following way: 










− = where xN is the normalized value, max(xE) is the maximum value that 
the variable takes over the sample of countries considered here (83 countries contained in WBES 
and /or in ICS: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) 
The regular employment weighted index is constructed from the raw variables in the following way 
(weights in parentheses): 
The employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant employee? (1/6) 
The employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker? (1/6) 
The law mandates retraining or replacement prior to dismissal? (1/6) 
There are priority rules applying to dismissal or lay-offs? (1/6) 
There are priority rules applying to re-employment? (1/6) 
Procedures (1/2) 
Is redundancy considered a “fair” ground for dismissal? (1/6) 
Legally mandated notice period for redundancy dismissal (in weeks) after twenty years of
continuous employment? Normalized (1/2) 
Firing costs (1/2) 
Severance pay for redundancy dismissal as number of months for which full wages are 
payable after continuous employment of twenty years? Normalized (1/2) 
The  temporary employment regulation index is equal to the simple average of the following 
variables: 
Fixed-term contracts are only allowed for fixed-term tasks? 
What is the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts (in months)? Normalized
Finally, the overall employment regulation index is the simple average of the regular and temporary 
employment indexes. 
 
  37Annex 2: Countries included in estimation samples. 
Sample of 78 countries (WBES Table 4): Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Sample of 81 countries (WBES Table 3): Sample of 78 countries plus: Belize, Trinidad & Tobago, 
West Bank-Gaza. 
Sample of 38 countries (Table 4): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia FYR, Malaysia, Moldova, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, and Zambia. 
Sample of 39 countries (ICS Table 3): Sample f 38 countries plus: Tajikistan.  
Sample of 45 countries (ICS Table 4): Sample of 38 countries plus: Algeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
India, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda.  
Sample of 47 countries (ICS Table 3): Sample of 39 countries plus: Algeria, Bangladesh, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda.  
Sample of 38 countries (ICS Tables 5, 6, 7): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia FYR, Malaysia, Moldova, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Table A3: Firms’ joint behavior according to their characteristics and de jure labor regulations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 









Average  0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 
          
Firm  size          
Small  0.13 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 
Medium  0.16 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.08 
Large  0.16 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.07 
          
Non-innovator  0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 
Innovator  0.16 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.08 
          
Perceived constraint due to 
labor market regulations 
        
No  obstacle  0.14  0.09        
Minor  0.15  0.09        
Moderate  0.17  0.07        
Major  0.19  0.07        
          
Stringency or regular 
employment regulations 
        
0.2         0.11  0.11 
0.4         0.15  0.08 
0.6         0.20  0.06 
0.8         0.25  0.04 
          
Combinations of regular and 
temporary labor regulations 
        
High TER and High RER      0.17  0.07  0.18  0.07     
Low TER and Low RER      0.13  0.10  0.14  0.09     
Low TER and High RER      0.21  0.05  0.20  0.05     
High TER and Low RER      0.12  0.09  0.10  0.10     
Note: These are predicted probabilities of adopting the relevant strategy calculated at the mean of all other variables. 
They are based on trivariate probit estimations. All specifications control for regional clustering and for the following 
variables: age of firm, government ownership, country’s income level, and industry. 
  41